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1 The debate on sustainable cities seems to be one of the major political challenges facing
the modern state. Urban governments are seeking ways to reduce the unjustifiably high
levels of energy and land consumption and preserve and protect the housing stock. In
North African cities, the underlying causes of this resource crisis are the low density of
the existing urban fabric, the lack of control of urban sprawl, and the increasing intensity
of agricultural land conversion which contributes to the rapid proliferation of informal
settlements. The apparent absence of rationality in urban planning often results from the
absence of functional procedures and institutional arrangements that would be necessary
to establish and oversee the application of sustainable construction standards. Moreover,
zoning  measures  motivated  by  opportunistic  considerations  which  do  not  conserve
resources  in  the  provision  of  activities,  result  not  only  from  the  growth  and  the
diversification  of  transport  systems  and  mobility  patterns,  but  also  by  the  physical
separation and distance between residential and workplace locations. Finally, the crisis
stems from a failure to provide extensive road networks and increase access and speed to
centres and transit nodes while supporting heavier vehicular loads.
2 Clearly,  the  chances  of  sustainable  urban planning  becoming  reality  in  a  context  of
deregulation  characterized  by  the  inadequacy  of  regulatory  mechanisms  (Boyer  and
Saillard, 2002) and urban management tools are remote. This paper points to some of the
What urban government for a sustainable urban planning? Conceptual analysis b...
Environnement Urbain / Urban Environment, Volume 4 | 2010
1
factors and practices that have given rise to this crisis. Given the apparent dichotomy
between government and private  sector  interests,  our  aim is  to  provide guidance in
determining which public  initiatives  should be  taken at  the  various  decision-making
stages and to examine the role of authorities in the production of sustainable cities. This
leads us to consider both the legitimate and illegitimate functions of urban governmental
organisations, and their part in the definition of urban policies prescribed by the central
government.  Taking  into  account  the  role  of  local  authorities  in  decision-making
processes throws a different light on the assumptions about urban sustainability. We can
restrict the study of the domain in which local and central governments operate to the
existence  or  lack  of  power  vested  to  local  bodies  by  the  state.  To  provide  a  better
theoretical grounding, the interplay between structures and actors in informal networks
must be addressed. Local government authorities operating in both formal and informal
“non-systemic networks” present within or outside social, political and territorial urban
systems could be the key to achieving the implementation of sustainable urban planning.
Furthermore,  the analysis of  the case of  Tunisian urban governments and their local
planning agendas to implement sustainable urban planning allows us to show that a
commitment  to  “sustainable  projects”  contributes  towards  the  increase  of
democratization.  For  instance,  local  authorities  could  move  outside  the  regulatory
frameworks and take on new informal forms (Stone, 1989) based on complicity and on
participating in informal networks and coalitions recognized by both external and local
actors. 
 
Overview of research, fieldwork instruments and
methods of analysis
3 To provide insights into these issues, a descriptive-transverse study was conducted using
a case study approach to collect detailed data on the various forms of urban government
and local  authorities  across Tunisian cities.  The scientific  method consisted of  thirty
semi-structured  interviews  and  an  analysis  of  archived  records  relating  to  the
composition and operations of the two terms of the elected municipal councils during the
period 1995-2005 within ten cities located on the outskirts of Tunis.
4 The records provided a host of information on council members, including age, place of
birth, occupation, political affiliation, number of years serving on council and political
stand. To verify whether they are representative of the population, electoral lists were
processed and analysed according to profession. Categories of voters were defined based
on  their  occupation,  level  of  education  as  well  as  spatial  distribution  across
neighbourhoods.  Qualitative  interview  data  was  analysed  in  order  to  validate  these
results by conducting tests until saturation was reached. Drawing on a wide range of
information, different categories of actors were defined and composed of local elected
members,  officials  and  municipal  technicians  and  well-to-do  leaders  involved  in  the
decision-making processes,  including neighbourhood committee members and former
members of municipal councils. 
5 Based  on  the  transcribed  discourses,  a  content  analysis  was  performed  to  identify
categories and conceptual developments. Research initially focused on an interpretation
of word frequency and the repeated occurrence of expressions. Conceptual references
used in the reports were then compared. By applying this analytical approach, we were
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confronted  with  some  methodological  constraints.  Indeed,  for  the  material  and  its
interpretation  phase,  we  tried  to  move  away  from  the  issues  surrounding  political
discourse and its implications to seek explanations at different scales of decision-making.
This more objective approach allowed us to better reflect the importance of the interface
between actors and specific urban development actions without detaching them from
existing power structures and network-based forms of organizing.
 
What type of democratic government can make cities
more sustainable? Defining situational concepts
6 In game theory, it is assumed that public decisions, actions and strategies are built on
existing democratic structures which are strengthened by a range of interventions at
different  scales,  particularly  when sustainability  is  involved  (Gibbs  and  Jonas,  2000).
Indeed, an urban government must bring together a host of agents and social actors to
help  ground  systemic  decision-making.  Although  local  authorities  do  not  act  in  a
transparent manner, the objectives of sustainability seem to be effectively met through
the democratization of local governments in North African cities.  While policymakers
make extensive use of concepts such as “sustainable planning”, “urban government” and
“governance”, we will place them into context and draw comparisons between territorial
scales and constructs.
7 The expressions “sustainable city” and “sustainable planning” refer, by extension, to a
new way of thinking based on the territory to develop cities. This conceptual model of
planning, promoted by United Nations agencies and established through international
programmes has evolved gradually in the past 20 years in the United states at a time
when cities  were faced with the challenges  of  metropolitan growth characterised by
urban  and  spatial  sprawl  accelerated  by  such  phenomenon  as  ex-urbanization  and
suburbanisation. New requirements for sustainability were introduced to design urban
policies that address the issues of uncontrolled and at times extreme and costly sprawl in
outlying  areas.  Populations  living  in  these  areas  must  often  rely  primarily  on  the
passenger automobile for their mobility, which increases natural resource and energy
consumption. On a more theoretical level, sustainable urban development is seen as a
move towards a more progressive vision of the city committed to the application of urban
ecology  principles.  Pilot  projects  have  shown  the  benefits  and  demonstrated  their
feasibility. A participatory approach is critical to achieving sustainable urban planning.
However,  this  approach comes  into  conflict  with  local  authorities  and  their  relative
autonomy  to  implement  policies  in  their  jurisdictions.  How  can  the  key  underlying
dimensions for understanding the distribution of power at the urban level be correctly
identified when the state continues to play such a pre-eminent role?
8 The urban regime theory (Stone, 1993) defines power as the set of arrangements and
relationships, both formal and informal. This theory goes beyond the division of roles
between public and private sectors;  instead, it  argues that actors cooperate and have
pooled resources to formulate and implement government decisions. In fact, according to
Stone, quoted by Le Galès (2003), such political arrangements shaped urban regimes that
resulted in setting up a policy-action matrix. It follows that urban governments play a
determining role in sustainable development policy formulation and implementation. In
constructing his urban regime paradigm, Stone focuses on the capacity building process
What urban government for a sustainable urban planning? Conceptual analysis b...
Environnement Urbain / Urban Environment, Volume 4 | 2010
3
to enable governments to provide coordination between various actors and to carry-out
sustainable policies in a fragmented urban context. In this case, we would argue that the
urban  regime  is  a  useful  framework  for  understanding  sustainable  urban  planning.
Indeed, on a local scale, urban regime can be helpful “to analyse the characteristics of
local governing coalitions and their policies” (Gibbs and Jonas, 2000, p.309). Moreover, by
adopting a pluralistic and progressive outlook, urban regime theory suggests that the role
of government may be limited to one of arbitrator between competing and pre-existing
interests  and  preferences.  Under  such  dynamic  and  constantly  evolving  conditions,
coalitions are understood as the moment of creating and channelling shared preferences.
Commenting on the Stone analysis, Godard argues that: “the legitimacy of the election in
an urban political system is not sufficient to establish the local power. To govern, this
power  must  succeed  in  mobilizing  sustainable  coalitions  of  interest  around  the
determination of priorities” (Godard, 1997, p. 132). Indeed, until now, the idea of coalition
has gained considerable support in the definition and validation of political structures
and the function of power. 
9 In short, the research carried out so far on networks and coalitions is still preliminary
and there is  no well-founded theory to date.  This fact has been well  established and
documented in the various publications of Lemieux (1976, 1977, 1991, 1997) and in the
work of Degenne and Forsé (1994). These authors offer insights on the possible limits of
theorizations and conceptualizations on networks in comparison with the game or the
systems  approach  theories.  Through  his  research  on  networks,  systems  and
empowerment, Lemieux has found that coalitions can be described as a form of network.
Drawing on the field of alliances, Lemieux offers the following definition of the coalition
as  “individual  or  collective  actors  working together  on a  temporary basis  who offer
support as well as come into conflict in their results and relationships. They can capture
more power and therefore prevail over their opponents and secure more advantages than
could be obtained if they did not join the coalition” (Lemieux, 1997, p. 367).
10 Indeed, in his theory on the networks and social systems linkages, Lemieux considers that
networks, by comparing them to systems, 
“[C]ould  be  characterised  as  intra-systemic  (for  example,  informal  groups  within
organization),  inter-systemic  (for  example,  [...]  alliance  networks  between  states),  trans-
systemic (for example, a network [... that] crosses somehow industrial or territorial systems),
and para-systemic (for example [a network] as a temporary step in the establishment of a
system).” (Lemieux, 1976, p. 257) 
11 Yet, a network is never systemic and cannot be subject to formalization. “With a lower
degree of organization, networks must be considered separate from systems” (Lemieux,
1976, p. 257). Viewed in this light, it can be argued that governance is an expression of the
process by which people meet in order to, 
“[C]reate from the very beginning a shared universe and commit efforts  to mobilize the
required resources. Governance can be conceived more as a series of informal arrangements
between actors within the same private and public domains, and is less about occupying
institutional positions. These arrangements are built around agreements on the principles of
legitimacy”. (Gaudin, Novarina, 1997, p. 63). 
12 Despite  their  conceptual  limitations,  network  and  urban  regime  theories  have
highlighted  the  importance  of  networking  and  partnership  processes.  However,  the
failure to properly consider stakeholder interactions at spatial scales is a major cause of
uncertainty (Gibbs and Jonas, 2000).
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13 What  the  innovative  notion  of  governance  offers  coalition,  urban regime and urban
government  “theories”  cannot  be  summarized  simply  as  the  experience  of  power
swapping between the state and local governments. Furthermore, it is not a reflection of
the attempt to coordinate public action by building vertical and horizontal relationships
through coalitions and networking. In the context of developing countries, this particular
type of  governance does bring the expected additional  benefits to the new modes of
urban regulation (De Terssac, 2003). Rather, governance provides the framework in which
local actors benefit from empowerment and redefine their relationships in a political
context marked by the fracture and the diversity of coalitions involving state-society and
state-cities institutions mandated to promote and oversee public-private partnerships
(PPP). Moreover, governance is a reflection of new formal and informal arrangements
operating through networks that offer opportunities to improve the democratic dialogue
among actors at the local level engaged in social and political negotiations. If governance
is considered by urban governments as an innovative concept, that is because it tries to
reconstruct  the  mechanisms  underlying  policy-making  through  political  and  social
regulations.  It  is  in this  sense that  some authors describe governance as  a  model  of
change based on a strong political will to implement sustainable planning and to draw
attention to project methods or design as well as processes rather than focusing solely on
results. With this mind, Souami (1998) argues that the development of the concept of
governance reveals  a  crisis  of  the welfare state and brings into focus the key issues
surrounding  decentralization.  According  to  the  author,  governance  stems  from  an
ideology of fear of conflict and of anxiety about the capacities and the powers of the state.
The fall of urban governments and the rise of urban governance are expressions of the
collective  failure  of  actors  falling  outside  the  state’s  sphere  of  influence  “which has
adopted  a  neo-liberal  economic  agenda,  which  includes  the  new  model  of  threat”
(Souami, 1998, p. 163). According to Le Galès, the concept of governance does not warrant
the development of a theory. This seems to be an interesting line of research to pursue.
Instead,  the  concept  of  governance  helps  to  understand  contemporary  forms  of
government and state-based processes.  In the author’s view, governance is  a second-
order concept that, while not able to provide answers, is useful in formulating questions
(Le Galès, 2003).
14 It  follows  that  local  governments  are  incapable  of  forming  an  urban  regime.
Arrangements between public and private sector interests strengthen the role of  the
regional authority while providing a response to the state policy on regional land use
planning. In addition, elements of the theory of urban government, i.e. the existence of
actors, the ability to act and the presence of organized interests, cannot be considered
within the scope of a regional authority which exercises hegemony and of cities without
an “ability to act” (Gibbs and Jonas, 2000). Le Galès (1998) and Gibbs and Jonas (2000)
critically assess the limits of importing notions of coalitions, urban regime theory and
governance from the American and the European experience to the sharply contrasting
context  in  Tunisia  marked by  a  strong  central  state  and  its  presence  at  different
territorial  levels.  Indeed,  if  these  theories  require  cooperation  and  relatively  stable
arrangements  between  political  interests,  bringing  together  stakeholders  and  other
public  and  private  actors,  this  context  cannot  be  analysed  from  the  standpoint  of
governance.  The scarcity of private enterprise in Tunisian cities means they have no
impact on urbanization since they display no systematic dependency. 
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15 The concentration of economic, administrative and political power in Tunis increases the
propensity of actors to form local coalitions in close cooperation with regional authorities
directly answerable to the state. The local power base must yield to regional directives in
carrying-out  national  policies  or  in  applying  sustainable  development  principles.
Involved in the national and regional decision-making processes, local policies are able to
conduct sustainable planning initiatives.
16 Can the concept of governance be applied to the urban context of Tunisian cities? The
answer is yes, but government must be understood in the medieval sense of the term,
that is  the locus of  power and management.  Local  power in the cities can rather be
studied in terms of “governmentality”.  According to Gaudin,  such an idea “had been
developed by the philosopher Michel Foucault at the end of his life and it dealt with
political practices in relation to protective paternal authority” (Gaudin, 2002, p. 33). In
Tunisia, local authorities are not involved in the process of urbanization and governance
is virtually absent from cities because of the inadequacy and fragility of the local political
system. On the one hand, technical and financial resources need to be mobilized and on
the  other,  often  unstable  coalitions  need  training  and  institutional  support.  The
hegemonic state is responsible for the present situation. However, the proximity to Tunis
and the centre of power allows local communities and settlements to exercise power and
control  over  their  territories.  In  fact,  these  edge  cities  must  accept  the  burden  of
implementing modern urban planning schemes, which means in practice, to agree to take
charge of promoting Information and communication technology’s (ICT). 
17 The method used for evaluating the scope and effectiveness of these concepts was to
study government representative structures in Tunisian cities and more particularly in
the small town of Medjez El Bab where “local power” was exercised by actors in the
attempt to apply the various principles involved in sustainable urban planning. Weak
power structures at the local level and conflicts of interest between actors have fuelled
the emergence of coalitions and complicit actions in the deliver of services to meet local
demand and the development of urban projects.
 
Long delays in the democratization of local
governments
18 Between  1985  and  1989,  during  the  recentralization  reform,  Tunisian  local  political
systems were dramatically altered to better reflect the policy of assigning more power to
regional delegates. The hierarchical structure was modified to provide governors and the
regional power base with more control at the expense of local elected officials. Within
this new territorial arrangement, governors assumed greater power and were appointed
the task of implementing the state policy aimed at reducing regional disparities while
leaving aside urban policy programmes “targeting” priority territories.  Faced with an
ineffective local power base and given the predominance of state regulations and the
control granted to regional governors, how can we describe the political arrangements
found in cities today? 
19 In Tunisian cities, municipal council is the most institutionalized structure of political
power  in  the  local  government  system.  Even  so,  examining  the  municipal  council
structure  provides  little  information  about  the  role  of  local  power  in  the  social
composition of  cities.  This  political  arrangement,  which is  established by the central
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government, devotes little attention to socio-cultural diversity and to the interests of the
local actors and agencies. This insufficient representation may limit the ability to meet
the  aspirations  of  the  population  and  give  precedence  to  some  socio-professional
categories  (SPC)  in  decision-making  processes  over  others.  Under  this  political
arrangement, urban governments have little choice but to favour some categories while
other voices often remain unheard within the political system made up of community
leaders. An analysis of councils confirms in part the extent to which this representational
bias is supported by the current structure.
20 Dominated by the ruling party coordination committees,  the local  political  system is
subject to the lists of electoral candidates proposed by its sub-committees and cells. In
the  smaller  territorial  subdivisions,  the  pre-existing  lists,  the  absence  of  political
opposition, constituent mobilization and the leverage of elected representatives from the
single ruling party, all combine to ensure that the government can continue to oversee
the population. Moreover, through its local cells, the ruling party can tighten its control
over regional and local space. Cities, regardless of their size, do not develop independent
political  institutions  mandated to  make decisions.  The centralization of  political  and
decision-making power in the capital locks cities and their surrounding suburbs and rural
areas  into  a  national  policy  framework.  The  monopoly  exercised by  central  political
authorities  through coordinating  committees  and  neighbourhoods  cells  in  the  urban
areas,  and village  councils  in  the  rural  areas  is  a  reflection of  the  hostility  towards
political pluralism in the way in which power is shared and represented within cities. 
21 Some SPCs are excluded from local representation in official political structures because
of a system that promotes the interests of elite at the expense of a more diverse social
base composed mainly of the working-class. Since the electorate is dominated by non
elite  groups,  SPCs  that  have  no  real  representation  are  needed  to  hold  legitimate
elections. Their presence, strongly desired in the electoral register, does eventually make
representation in municipal councils more equitable. This political stake granted to local
special interests and minority groups who can take part in the local power structure
carries clearly more weight than other selection criteria such as the availability of elected
representatives to serve the public interest, building capacity for resource mobilization,
the mayor’s personality and the social and professional diversity of council members. In
sum, the state holds a monopoly on the selection of local representatives, which seems to
be the only way agglomerations, towns, or neighbourhoods are able to exert political
influence.
22 Clearly, the broad geographical basis in which the dominant party operates, and its high
level of social acceptability hinder the emergence of political pluralism at the local level.
Pluralism is undermined by the absence of financial support or targeted initiatives and
programmes. Slightly less than 5% of elected members of council only, came from the
middle to lower classes and formed the opposition (personal survey, 2005). These elected
officials have recently joined the council and with hardly any clout, are often absent from
meetings. In most small or medium sized cities, the average council member turnover
rate is never more than 50%. Mayors and councillors are charged with multiple mandates
and  thus  can  explain  the  reasons  why  the  democratisation  of  local  decision-making
mechanisms has so far been disappointing.
23 The  central  state  exercises  its  administrative  and  political  power  across  various
jurisdictional levels.  However,  in  urban areas,  the  legitimacy  of  such actions  can be
established outside state structures. Moreover, powers granted to municipal councils in
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the area of urban planning are incomplete to the extent that the transfer of legitimacy
does not involve urban policy instruments. Nevertheless, elected members and managers
develop the necessary skills to develop local initiatives instead of the ones proposed and
find  ways  around  the  official  channels.  This  enables  them  to  decrease  the  risk  of
triggering social and urban tensions around speculation and land ownership claims. 
24 The inherent inefficiency of the local political system comes from the fact that regulation
mechanisms  are  highly  centralized.  The  state  defines  the  broad  rules  and  possesses
significant resources to sustain its role as a regulator at the expense of a democratic local
government. It can therefore exert “hierarchical control” by its virtual monopoly over
the distribution of resources. An indication of the weakness of local power is found in the
central  authority’s control over coalitions,  conflicts and the coordination of the local
economic  interests.  Indeed,  as  Le  Galès  indicates,  this  type  of  policy  “involves
domination, control and ability to sanction on the one hand, obedience and discipline on
the other hand, does not involve cities in a sustainable urban planning process, but keeps
them away” (2003, p. 31).
25 The conditions of local political representation and of decision-making structures are
fragile.  That  is  why  when  submitted  to  act  in  a  formal  manner,  the  trend  towards
informal networks of power becomes much more pronounced. Coalitions formed by local
actors based on common grounds or on differentiated responsibilities and working at
different geographical and political scales, constitute an illustration of an informal way of
influencing policy options and playing a more important role in urban planning.
 
Table 1. Demographic and political profiles of elected municipal councils (City councils on the









  M/F Ruling Opposition party  
President 53 100 0 100 0 50  
First assistant 54 100 0 100 0 20  
Assistant 50 95 5 100 0 55  
Councillors 49 62 38 92 8 70  
Municipal
councils
52 77,5 22,5 95,5 4,5 49  
Source: Kahloun, 2008
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Practices of complicity in the face of conflicts of
interest: a new alternative for sustainable urban
planning
26 Local strategies,  applied in the process urban planning policy-making and developing
infrastructure  projects  have  helped voice  and frame the  demands  introduced in  the
politico-administrative system in which the local cells of the ruling party play a leading
role. It remains no less true that they are chiefly used to establish liaisons with various
ruling party  actors  and maintain good relationships.  At  the local  and regional  level,
seeking  membership  in  a  political  party  can  provide  an  individual  with  a  unique
opportunity to take charge of and formulate social demands. Membership is particularly
crucial for mayors or community leaders and political status depends essentially on their
arbitration or mediation capabilities.
 
Conflicts among different actors and arbitration: informal ways to
make the city
27 The majority  of  infrastructure  projects  become political  issues  which arise  from the
grievances by individuals and groups contacted and supported by the local cells. These
proposals  which are officially defended by the cells  and recorded by the omdas (the
deputy prefect) are reformulated by the delegate (the prefect) for the region’s centre
before  being submitted to  the  region’s  governor  in  whom is  vested all  political  and
administrative  power.  Central  state  departments  define  their  infrastructure
improvement programmes in cities on the basis of the regional proposals. It follows that
local coordination cells are playing a key role in bringing local grievances to the attention
of government.
28 The opening of  bank services  in Medjez  El  Bab offers  an illustrative  example of  the
importance of local city leaders in advising and directing the demands. In fact, the high
proportion of inhabitants of Medjez El Bab who are customers of the Bank of the Habitat
(BH) in Béja (the main city of the department), provided the basis for the claim made by
the population for a local branch. It should be noted that in 2005, this branch of the BH
was  under  construction in  front  of  the  Medjez  El  Bab  courthouse.  At  the  time,  this
request, which led to a surge of interest by the local population, was not immediately
submitted  by  the  municipal  authority  to  the  governor.  Due  to  conflicting  relations
between the governor and the mayor, the request was conveyed by one of the leaders
representing  the  interests  of  merchants  and  contractors  of  the  Tunisian  Union  of
Industry, Trade and Crafts (TUITC). In fact, the leader who served in the role of broker
owns several businesses in the city of Argoub Ezzater. In the absence of a genuine local
representational body of the TUITC in Medjez El Bab, one of his offices was used to hold
meetings  and  appointments  with  local  and/or  regional  managers.  By  reaching  an
agreement  through arbitration with the governor,  he was able  to  play the role  of  a
“driving  belt”  (Dobry,  1992)  for  local  grievances.  Through  his  power  of  patronage,
strengthened by his political allegiance, he was in a position to ensure that his informal
power is legitimate and to use his clout more formally to act on behalf of the governor
and the local population.
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29 Whether the city is rewarded or penalised depends in practice on the capacity of its local
actors to develop, either on a formal or an informal basis,  arbitration actions and to
channel and transmit local claims and demands. Indeed, forging an alliance between the
representatives  of  local  authorities  both  formally  and  informally  seems  to  be  a
determining factor to improve incorporation of grievances into local action plans, bring
them to the negotiation table and have them considered by the political authorities at the
regional or national levels.  We argue that this kind of structure allows some form of
complicity through coalitions, and can contribute to the transformation of the political
picture of cities and therefore, to the transformation of the urban form. 
30 Within a context of embedded institutional networks, each with their own priorities, local
and central government reports pile up on the desks of the delegate, the governor and
the  local  authorities  of  the  ruling  party,  which  seems  to  block  urban  development.
Indeed, autonomous policy-making by local elected members is impossible since every
project  proposal  or action must first  be authorized by the governor.  In short,  urban
development is subject to a consultation procedure with the central authorities at the
regional  level.  More  “autonomous”  mayors  who  did  not  consent  in  joining  local  or
regional  coalitions  of  interests  have  seen  their  proposals  blocked  by  the  regional
authorities. The refusal to accept regional political decisions dictated by the central state
is, in fact, regarded as an obstacle to the process of change and as an attempt to obstruct
the state’s regional development.  Depending on their personalities and the degree of
complicity with the party cells, mayors can either get their strategies in place or, on the
contrary,  fail  to rally the population.  The mayor of  Medjez El  Bab provides a telling
example. He “attracts investment to take planning action” (interviewed mayor, personal
survey,  Kahloun,  2008).  For  instance,  not  only  did the Ministry of  Youth and Sports
sanction the mayor’s proposal to relocate the municipal stadium from a densely-built
area, but it accepted to finance the building of a new stadium as well. Although applying
for zoning changes would have been the final requirement for this project to move ahead,
it was rejected in the end by the governor despite the availability of necessary resources
and the benefits of redeveloping the former site for residential purposes. However, the
mayor  stood  his  ground  and  defended  his  position  along  with  local  and  regional
representatives as the governor faced an impasse. The mayor established an informal
network with the central agencies of the state by bypassing the administrative hierarchy
under the governor’s control. Meanwhile, other initiatives spearheaded by the mayor,
such as restoring the facade of the Medjez El Bab Library, or work on redeveloping Arbi
Zarrouk Avenue could not have gone ahead without state backing. This has lead to a
larger conflict of power sharing. The regional council’s position on the powers of the
mayor can be summarized as “a malleable dish towel”, according to the expression used
by the interviewed mayor (personal survey, Kahloun, 2008). The refusal of the mayor of
Medjez El Bab to align himself with the network’s policy and to be complicit with interest
groups prevented him from consolidating his political power base and maintaining it at
the regional level. Nonalignment and the rejection of political clientelism would later
ruin his chances of re-election.
31 In the absence of a genuine local urban policy, and to boost their political image, some
mayors are looking for new arenas in which to exercise power. For example, increasing
the public’s engagement in cultural activities is a strategy to gain a political foothold in
the city. Only with the continued support of community-based initiatives can the power
base include new informal coalitions and provide the conditions for greater autonomy in
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implementing urban projects. While these projects may not improve the conditions of life
for all inhabitants or provide much towards sustainability, such actions at the district
level, although limited in scope, are a reflection of a desire to broaden the local power
base throughout the city.
32 Following the example of the strategies to develop infrastructure or to facilitate urban
regeneration, the sphere of urban planning appears to be where conflicts between actors
give rise to informal networks on which the exercise of authority in cities rests. Indeed,
extensions to the urban areas, which are not subject to a framework of negotiation, are
frequently  proposed  without  being  sufficiently  studied  and  planned  in  advance.  For
example,  in medium and small  cities  on the outskirts  of  Tunis  (Mornaguia,  Khélidia,
Mornague, Medjez El Bab, Borj El Amri, etc.), planners refer to urban development plans
(UDP) that are outdated. The urban extension proposals are most likely to be a source of
disagreement between local elected representatives and the central authorities of the
Ministry of Agriculture. Since the 1970s, Medjez El Bab has tolerated the construction of
housing  estates  outside  of  the  authorized  urban  growth  boundary,  even  though  is
constitutes a violation of regulations and provisions of the former UDP adopted in 1978.
As  a  result  of  this  breach  of  law,  sprawl  and  anarchic  urbanization  has  increased
considerably at the expense of agricultural land. The urbanized area, which totalled 553
hectares  in  1978,  has  almost  doubled  to  reach  nearly  1200  hectares  in  2002.  Land
speculation  which  spread  across  the  growth  boundary  established  in  the  UDP  is
responsible for the proliferation of informal settlements in areas classified as non-urban
by the Ministry of  Agriculture.  Places like El  Ajama,  El  Bahrine,  El  Azima,  El  Argoub
established over the past fifteen years are illustrations of the tremendous increase in
informal  settlements  in these zones.  Given this  situation,  the municipality  sought  to
integrate these new urbanized zones during the plan review process before submitting it
to the Ministry of Agriculture for approval. Although some 80% of the land is urbanized,
central  authorities  refuse  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of  urban  extensions.  As  a
consequence,  more  than  100  hectares  are  now  located  on  properties  zoned  for
agricultural use since 1983.
33 In many respects,  it  seems that the expansion of  cities  is  not often carried out in a
sustainable way since there is no correspondence with the needs for land conversion. The
resulting anarchic spatial sprawl, tolerated by local elected officials, reflects a politico-
administrative compromise between the regional development councils and the central
state authorities. It follows that the decentralization of local decision-making autonomy
may counteract the state controlled regulatory framework that underpins the process of
urbanization. Indeed, when local and central authorities come together to negotiate a
strategy to develop a sustainable urban planning agenda, the resulting structure provides
a more appropriate regulatory response to urban growth. Yet, political power, when it is
enforced  unilaterally  in  order  to  come  to  terms  with  the  emergence  and  spread  of
spontaneous urban development  and to  meet  the demands of  some segments  of  the
population,  facilitates  the  implementation  of  non-regulatory  approaches  to  address
urbanization and the  anarchic  spatial  sprawl  of  cities.  In  spite  of  this,  a  number  of
principles must be followed by authorities when applying predefined models to legitimize
sustainable planning guidelines and actions for all cities. These principles of planning
include increasing density in existing urban areas, reducing the effects of urban sprawl
on agricultural land, providing social housing to promote the inclusion of marginalized
groups, supporting the development of a second urban core area, and addressing the
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problems of traffic congestion and parking problems. They have consequently become
key elements for sustainable urban planning, but from this comprehensive perspective,
they cannot account for the current state of local environmental resources and correctly
address  issues  relating to  infrastructure and employment  needs.  Therefore,  given its
limited ability to anticipate and solve problems and the low esteem in which it is held by
local elected members and property owners, the development plan is used in many cases
merely as a technical management instrument and as a reference document for building
and subdividing and not as a legal and regulatory structure. The discrepancy between the
overall urban growth trends and local urban planning can be demonstrated by comparing
the life-cycle of the urban development plans that should help create a sustainable future
for cities and the effective review and follow-up process. In 1978, after 26 years, Medjez El
Bab’s UDP was finally renewed. Over this period of time, a previously approved plan,
partially applied by the local council, was used as a reference to provide standardized
solutions to urban development problems.
 
Agenda 21: An attempt at democratizing local planning?
34 The purpose of this research is not to examine the sustainable development process in
the  Tunisian  context,  but  rather  to  provide  insights  into  the  efforts  that  can  be
undertaken by local urban governments to create more sustainable cities. Despite the
restrictions imposed on local governments in Tunisia, we recognize that the sustainable
development  process  plays  an  important  role  in  public  policy-making.  However,  the
state’s sustainability goals are couched in “vague terms” at the local level (Gibbs and
Jonas, 2000). Indeed, adapting “Agenda 21” and “sustainable cities” programmes to the
local context becomes more of an issue depending on the degree of decentralization in
urban planning. 
35 These  programmes  are  considered  as  pilot  projects  that  lie  outside  the  regulatory
structure used for defining a common set of rules for urban development. They are an
expression of the state’s determination to regulate urban development, particularly by
transferring greater decision-making powers to the local level. In political discourse, a
local  Agenda 21  is  “a  first  attempt  at  defining a  form of  local  governance in  urban
planning”. Created under the aegis of the Ministry of the Environment, this initiative,
despite its limited scope, is founded on the principle of a “sustainable environment” and
provides a  starting point  for  future urban development.  As  Gibbs and Jonas indicate
(2000), this process “appears to have been deliberately orchestrated by the central state”.
By comparing the urban development plan and the local investment programme with
other planning tools such as the master plan, we can argue that the local Agenda 21 is
entirely disconnected from economic reality and strategies. 
36 The local Agenda 21 is based on the premise of informal coordination between various
local and central non institutionalized actors joining in a process that is overseen by the
state  representatives.  This  informal  attempt  to  broaden the  social  base  by  including
representatives  of  the  local  government  such  as  the  cells  of  the  ruling  party,  the
neighbourhood committees and the community-based associations where they exist, can
be seen as part of a wider regulatory framework which is “intended as a showpiece for
both  the  local  population  and  international  actors”(Chabbi,  2005,  p.  101).  These
showpieces  serve  as  a  mechanism  to  “obtain  international funds”  flowing  through
What urban government for a sustainable urban planning? Conceptual analysis b...
Environnement Urbain / Urban Environment, Volume 4 | 2010
12
agencies that are promoting less rigid cooperation, and to improve the image of the state
and thus pay lip service to the idea of serving the interests of cities.
37 In addition to these attempts to involve local elected representatives and citizens in an
urban development project, the state’s ability to include environmental concerns in the
design and planning of cities is essential to the success of the local Agenda 21. However, it
is not clear whether this is helping increase public authorities’ awareness of the need to
strengthen  local  decision-making  through  the  creation  of  new  local  structures  and
negotiation processes. Although in some local Agenda 21 pilot projects, such as Medjez El
Bab,  the intention of the central government to empower cities and strengthen local
governments has not been expressed. With its particular emphasis on the environmental
conditions,  the  project  involves  local  stakeholders  in  the  process  which  serves  to
legitimize the state’s monopolistic control over urban development. It should be noted
that the development of this local Agenda 21 is realized in part through Tunisian and
German cooperation. It is supported by funds from the GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit), an international cooperation enterprise based in Germany
and active in the area of sustainable development. In support of the Medjez El Bab pilot
project, a process was initiated in the year 2000 and enabled a diverse set of local actors
and government representatives to come together informally. The local committee which
was formed out of the process provided a detailed diagnosis of the city, in collaboration
with  national  and  international  experts  who  have  received  specialized  training  to
implement such initiatives. Together, they set up a development programme in an effort
to strengthen the support towards the sustainable development of the city. The work of
the Committee  21 of  Medjez  El  Bab resulted in  a  development  programme aimed at
safeguarding the  environment  through urban development,  improving economic  and
social conditions and promoting citizenship.
38 The results of the experience of the local Agenda 21 in Medjez El Bab serve as an example
to illustrate how engaging the population in a project, despite being a small town with
few resources, is essential to success. The Committee 21 was founded not as an institution
but as a process through which informal coalitions were created between the elected city
and central state representatives who are responsible for environmental protection and
land use planning. This kind of working partnership was built on an informal network of
managers and citizens involved in various forms of consultation.
39 Urban development or regeneration actions carried out by this partnership comprising
the  local  elected  representatives,  the  committees  of  neighbourhoods,  the  central
representatives of the GTZ and the ministry of the Environment, were limited in scope.
These actions depended more on the mayor’s determination to act locally by drawing on
historical and cultural elements to revitalize green and symbolic spaces. This initiative is
evidence that urban coalitions can be formed in small towns even when local Agenda
projects  were  unsuccessful  in  larger  cities.  Practices  of  complicity  allow  abetter
understanding  of  the  conflicting  pressures  that  confront  small  towns  in  trying  to
maintain  a  balance  between local  demands  and  national  interests.  The  political  and
financial dependence on central government remains one of the main barriers to local
action. This dominant role of central authorities reduces the ability of local actors to
define a sustainable urban planning agenda.
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Conclusion
40 To broaden the debate on the issue of urban governance, we have given more thought to
the practice  of  sustainable  urban planning in  North African cities  developed outside
recognized government structures. Faced with the immense fragility of representative
and decision-making structures in Tunisian cities,  both the formal  bureaucratic state
apparatus and informal networks created by local actors did manage to collaborate to
define  and  implement  an  urban  regulatory  plan.  In  this  policy  arena,  the  urban
government can operate in “intra or inter-systemic networks” beyond the formal power
structure where local action lies outside the control of central authorities. Functioning
through these networks of informal or implicit relationships, the system of local power
can  determine  policy  positions  and  decisions  at  various  scales.  Advocated  by
international  organizations  and  prescribed  by  the  central  government,  development
programmes cannot be effectively implemented in cities of the developing world where
resource requirements are not fully addressed by an accompanying urban regulatory
plan. For this reason, the local Agenda 21, both in this case study and in general in other
Tunisian cities, did not properly reflect the founding principle of “think globally and act
locally” or the mode of “thinking in a sectoral way and acting in a central way”. The
current environment is not conducive to successfully carry out such a programme. The
foundations  for  institu-tionalized  urban  governments  must  first  be  laid  and  central
authorities must take into account local interests and needs in decision-making.
41 In addition, if the local Agenda represents for some Tunisian cities a grassroots attempt
to build sustainable urban environments and democracy at the local government level,
then the results so far are not conclusive. To improve the chances of success, the local
power base must play a significant role in decision-making and strengthen their local
capacity.  The  Agenda  21  programme  is  voluntary  and  not  based  on  contractual
obligations between the state and the local or regional authorities. Rather, it serves as a
practical guide to raise awareness about the main problems and issues at stake in urban
development,  but  offers  little  support  for  sustainable  economic  growth  and  urban
planning. Instead, it identifies specific actions for stakeholders that should be followed by
local governments. 
42 While some measures were successfully implemented through the Medjez El Bab local
Agenda 21, it did not contribute to solving local urban development problems such as
flooding  caused  by  the  Wadi  Medjerda  runoff,  the  impact  of  land  set-asides  on  the
evolution of agricultural holdings, and the insufficient control of land development and
urban sprawl. As a consequence, the project had no direct effect on the sustainability of
urban development and urban planning across Tunisian cities. Running alongside other
projects, it is a showpiece that enables the state and international agencies to act in an
opportunistic way to obtain funds. They harness the potential of local authorities and
take advantage of their gullibility to convey an image to international audiences that they
were able to conduct a successful experiment in capacity building for local governance
and therefore demonstrate the relevance of pursuing sustainable development projects.
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ABSTRACTS
In Tunis, as in most developing cities, the highly centralized system of authority can be seen as
the single supplier-regulator of urban development and sustainability. In such contexts in which
citizen  participation  in  urban  management  is  undervalued,  concepts  such  as  “urban
government” and “governance” may appear to be particularly irrelevant to the “networking”
practices of actors within their own social and political structures. With a focus on the system of
local power in Tunisian cities, this study shows that actions and decisions taken by emerging
forms of local government remain highly vulnerable due to extra-local forces. Such a paradox in
the  forms  of  power  and  their  manner  of  conduct,  by  comparing  contextual  and  conceptual
frameworks,  draws attention to the issues  of  democracy in action at  the local  level  and the
overall impact of these issues on sustainable urban planning.
A Tunis, comme dans la majorité des villes en développement, le système de pouvoir centralisé se
présente comme l’unique pourvoyeur-régulateur de l’urbanisation et de sa durabilité. Dans de
pareils  contextes qui  sous-intègrent  la  participation citoyenne dans la  gestion des villes, des
notions  telles  que  «  gouvernement  urbain  »  et  «  gouvernance  »  peuvent  apparaître  tout
particulièrement inappropriées face aux fonctionnements en « réseaux » des acteurs dans leurs
structures sociales et politiques. L’étude des villes tunisiennes révèle l’émergence de nouvelles
formes de gouvernement local dont les actions et les décisions demeurent fortement fragilisées
par les pouvoirs extra-locaux. Ce paradoxe dans les formes de pouvoirs et dans leur manière
d’agir amène à s’interroger, pour ainsi partir d’une confrontation entre contextes et « concepts »,
sur les enjeux de la démocratisation de l’action locale et leurs répercussions sur l’urbanisme
durable.
INDEX
Mots-clés: urbanisme durable, plan d’action local, gouvernement urbain, gouvernance,
pratiques de connivence
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